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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court will decide the pleading 
requirement that a complainant must meet in order to bring a viable 
claim against high-ranking government officials1 for their 
subordinates’ allegedly unconstitutional actions. The case marks an 
intersection between the liberal pleading rules of federal procedure 
and the qualified immunity generally provided to high government 
officials. On June 14, 2007, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and 
reversed in part a decision by the Eastern District of New York 
denying the motions to dismiss of several current and former 
government officials from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
including Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), including Director of the FBI Robert Mueller, 
and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).2 
Following his arrest by the FBI and Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”), Iqbal, a Muslim originally from 
Pakistan, was designated as a “high interest” detainee and separated 
from the general jail population.3 Despite the four arguments for 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Generally, “high-ranking officials” does not have a specific definition, but courts have 
used their discretion in differentiating these senior officers from those “front-line officials” who 
have access to less confidential information. Due to their access to sensitive information, district 
courts subject high-ranking officials only to tightly controlled discovery, and only after discovery 
of front-line individuals has demonstrated a need for further discovery from higher ranking 
officials. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 2. Id. at 147. 
 3. Id. at 147–48. 
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reversal put forward by the defendants, the Second Circuit held that 
Iqbal established a genuine claim that should continue to discovery 
without meeting the stricter pleading standard the government 
officials argued was needed to overcome their qualified immunity.4 
In finding the defendants’ “qualified immunity defense” 
insufficient to justify the case’s early dismissal, the Second Circuit 
made two important holdings. The first holding found that based on 
conflicting signals between the Supreme Court’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly5 holding and that case’s progeny,6 courts should apply a 
flexible “plausibility standard” for pleadings. This is not a heightened 
pleading standard for all cases, but is rather a standard applied at the 
court’s discretion. The court can request that a pleader support his 
claim with additional factual allegations where the court determines 
some amplification is needed to make the claim plausible.7 Secondly, 
the court held that for pleading purposes, the supervisors’ personal 
involvement in the harsh treatment of the detainee was sufficient to 
impute to them knowledge of the policies and procedures concerning 
the arrest and detention of detainees in the New York federal system.8 
On June 16, 2008, the Supreme Court granted government 
officials Ashcroft and Mueller’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
determine whether Iqbal’s conclusory complaint that the high-ranking 
officers’ condoned alleged unconstitutional acts committed by their 
subordinates is sufficient to state a claim against the high-ranking 
officials or whether the allegation should be dismissed at the 
preliminary stage because of the policy underlying officials’ qualified 
immunity defense.9 
 
 4. Id. at 178. 
 5. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2006). 
 6. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168, 69 (1993) (finding the courts have a duty to weed out unmeritorious claims 
before discovery)); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (holding that plaintiff does not 
have to present clear and convincing evidence of improper motive in order to defeat an official’s 
motion for summary judgment). 
 7. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–158. 
 8. Id. at 166. 
 9. Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (mem.) (June 16, 2008) 
(No. 07-1015). 
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II.  FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the months after 9/11, all Arab or Muslim men arrested in the 
New York City area on criminal or immigration charges were 
classified as “high interest” until the FBI concluded an investigation 
of the allegations against them.10 This practice resulted in several men 
being detained for months without evidence linking them to 9/11 or 
any other terrorist plot.11 
Plaintiff Iqbal is a Muslim from Pakistan who was arrested a few 
weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York 
City and Washington, D.C.12 Following his arrest, Iqbal was placed in 
the general population of a Brooklyn jail until January 8, 2002, when 
he was assigned to a special section of the jail reserved for “high 
interest” detainees. There, he was subjected to the most restrictive 
type of control available within the jail.13 
Iqbal’s complaint alleges that during his time in the high-security 
section of the prison, he was kept in solitary confinement, was not 
supplied with adequate food, was left in the rain for extended periods 
of time, had his prayers interrupted, had his conversations with an 
attorney interrupted, and was brutally beaten by guards when he 
protested a fourth consecutive strip and body cavity search.14 Iqbal 
spent six months in the prison’s high-security ward before being 
released back into the general prison population after ultimately 
pleading guilty to two conspiracy charges.15 
In 2004, Iqbal16 sued Attorney General Ashcroft, Director of the 
FBI Mueller, seven other federal officials, various prison staff, and the 
United States for twenty-one claims, including religious 
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and various Eighth Amendment 
claims such as interference with his conferences with counsel.17 The 
defendants moved to dismiss Iqbal’s action for four reasons: (1) the 
 
 10. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id., at 147–48. 
 13. Id. at 148. 
 14. Id. at 149. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Following the Eastern District’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, co-plaintiff 
Elmaghraby’s claims against the United States were settled for $300,000. Thus, Elmaghraby’s 
claims will not be at issue in the appeal. Id. at 147. 
 17. Id. at 149–50 n.3. 
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action was “precluded by special factors,” namely the post-9/11 
context; (2) the defendants were all protected by “qualified 
immunity”; (3) the doctrine of respondeat superior did not extend to 
the supervisory defendants; and (4) some of the defendants were not 
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of New York.18 
The district court denied Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s motions to 
dismiss and they appealed on the basis of the second argument—
qualified immunity.19 The two officers appealed to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which held that Iqbal’s complaint sufficiently stated 
a claim against the federal officials.20 Defendants Ashcroft and 
Mueller then appealed to the Supreme Court.21 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal has a complicated genealogy due to the breadth 
of the issues on appeal. The first issue is the applicability of Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which 
allows private causes of action against government officials for 
violating certain constitutional rights.22 The “Bivens suit” is a unique 
cause of action stemming from the fact that officials inherently pose a 
greater threat to individuals’ rights than do private persons, thus 
justifying the federal courts’ use of broad discretion crafting relief to 
remedy constitutional wrongs at the hands of government officials.23 
As the Bivens opinion notes, because the availability of a qualified 
immunity defense was not decided by the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court did not address the applicability of the defense.24 But, 
as the majority implied, the qualified immunity defense question 
would eventually require discussion.25 
A line of cases followed that considered whether a plaintiff must 
meet an enhanced pleading standard—beyond that of the notice 
 
 18. Id. at 150. 
 19. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 20. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 143. 
 21. Id. at 151. 
 22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 389 (1971) (holding that a search and arrest of plaintiffs’ private residence made without 
probable cause and by federal agents acting under the color of his authority gives rise to a 
private cause of action for damages due to the agents’ unconstitutional conduct). 
 23. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , 684 (1946). 
 24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397–98. 
 25. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/15/2009 11:54:50 AM 
2009] ASHCROFT V. IQBAL 379 
 
pleading dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26—in order 
to defeat the presumption of qualified immunity that typically 
protects government officials.27 The qualified immunity discussions in 
these cases tended to reach similar conclusions: where a supervisory 
position is sufficient to absolve a defendant of liability based on 
qualified immunity, efforts to expand pleading requirements in any 
manner without a congressional amendment to the Federal Rules 
have failed.28 
A. The Basics of Bivens Suits 
The resolution of Iqbal’s issue of whether conclusory allegations 
fulfill the pleading standards against high-ranking officials will greatly 
aid federal courts in defining the outermost borders of a Bivens cause 
of action.29 Though the holding in Bivens dealt specifically with 
establishing a private cause of action against federal officers for 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights,30 the Court has also allowed 
Bivens suits in cases involving violations of the Eighth Amendment.31 
Generally, the facts required in pleadings are governed by Rule 
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8(a)(2), 
conclusory allegations are sufficient to overcome a motion to 
dismiss.32 The law remains unsettled, however, as to whether a 
heightened pleading standard is required in Bivens actions, 
particularly when the defendant establishes a “qualified immunity 
defense” and the allegations are limited to supervisory involvement, 
racial or religious animus, or conspiracy.33 
Establishing the pleading requirements in a qualified immunity 
case is necessary to preserve the very existence of the doctrine, the 
 
 26. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain, in relevant part, “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(2). 
 27. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). 
 28. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 554. 
 29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (Feb. 6, 2008) (No. 07-
1015). 
 30. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
 31. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (finding that a Bivens action was allowed 
in an Eighth Amendment case, even where it would not be sustained under normal tort law). 
 32. Supra, note 26. 
 33. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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purpose of which is to protect high-level government officials from 
unnecessary interference with the performance of their duties.34 
Rather than creating a mere defense to liability, qualified immunity is 
an affirmative defense to a law suit even being entertained by a court, 
but it is waived if not asserted during the preliminary proceedings of a 
trial.35 Because the Court has not clearly delineated how the Bivens 
doctrine and qualified immunity interact, the Second Circuit dealt 
with seemingly conflicting precedent when it analyzed whether 
conclusory allegations in a pleading suffice to overcome the qualified 
immunity defense.36 
This unsettled gap in the law is evident when one considers the 
Second Circuit’s application of Colon v. Coughlin37 in the case at hand. 
In Colon, the Second Circuit allowed a prisoner to assert a private 
cause of action against a state prison commissioner alleging a 
conspiracy by local prison officials.38 The court permitted the action 
even though the complaint set forth no facts connecting the prison 
commissioner to the supposed conspiracy or suggesting deficient 
training of the prison officials.39 The court held that the personal 
involvement of a supervisor can be established with evidence that the 
supervisor “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional 
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or 
custom . . . or the [supervisor] exhibited deliberate indifference to the 
rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that 
unconstitutional acts were occurring.”40 
Similarly, the Second Circuit allowed Iqbal to use a constructive 
notice theory to sue high-level government supervisors for their 
subordinates’ unconstitutional actions. This theory enabled Iqbal to 
establish Ashcroft and Mueller’s personal involvement in the actions 
based solely on their positions of authority and, according to Iqbal, 
take them outside the aegis of the qualified immunity doctrine. 
 
 34. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 541 (1985) (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 35. Id., at 526. 
 36. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 155–57. 
 37. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 873. 
 40. Id.; Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of a Heightened Pleading Standard 
Requirement 
In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 
Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court found that it would be 
“impossible to square [a] ‘heightened pleading standard’ [for qualified 
immunity] . . . with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set by the 
Federal Rules.”41 Leatherman recognized that the Federal Rules 
provided specific instances in which greater particularity than the 
“short plain statement” could be required in a complaint. Because 
neither of the specific instances involved the claim brought by the 
claimants, the Court refused to apply the greater particularity 
standard.42 Emphasizing the Court’s history of refusing to interpret 
the federal pleading rules beyond their express language,43 Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion stressed the federal courts’ role in using 
summary judgment and control of discovery to “weed out” 
unmeritorious claims.44 This characterization of the judiciary’s role in 
controlling litigation can be extended to support the maintenance of 
the qualified immunity doctrine’s integrity via summary judgment and 
discovery, thus sidestepping the specific procedure of amending the 
Federal Rules. 
Five years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question again 
in Crawford-El v. Britton and rejected a heightened pleading standard 
for a prisoner’s claim seeking damages from a correctional officer for 
a constitutional claim requiring proof of improper motive—malice.45 
The Court determined that the complainant does not have to produce 
evidence of improper motive at the pleading stage to defeat a motion 
of summary judgment. Instead, the Court opted to protect 
government officials at a later stage in the proceedings by requiring a 
heightened standard of proof for cases based solely on malice, thereby 
emphasizing the courts’ abilities to tailor discovery under Rule 26 
rather than their power to dismiss a claim in summary judgment.46 The 
Court’s holding that “‘bare allegations of malice’ cannot overcome 
 
 41. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 168 (1993). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 44. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 45. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 577 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 588 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)). 
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the qualified immunity defense” maintained the protection afforded 
officials by employing the very tools Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined 
in Leatherman. 
More recently the Court made its most direct ruling on the 
pleading standard for qualified immunity cases in Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema. In Swierkiewicz, the Court not only held that a heightened 
pleading standard was inapplicable to an employment discrimination 
plaintiff, but also that a “requirement of greater specificity for 
particular claims is a result that must be obtained by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”47 This 
holding continues to emphasize the concerns put forward by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in Leatherman and the Court’s commitment to 
respecting the traditional Rules’ amendment process before the Court 
imposes a higher pleading standard than the standard currently 
required.48 Although the Court has not reconsidered its position since 
Swierkiewicz, a circuit split regarding the pleading required to 
overcome the qualified immunity remains. 
C. “Plausibility” and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
The Court’s most recent developments regarding the standard for 
assessing the adequacy of pleadings occurred in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, which involved the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of 
an antitrust case brought by consumers against incumbent local 
phone companies.49 The question in Bell Atlantic was whether a 
Section 1 Sherman Act antitrust complaint requires a heightened 
pleading standard.50 Generally, liability under the Sherman Act 
requires a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The complaint, however, 
alleged only “consciously parallel behavior” between the defendants, 
suggesting that a conspiracy was likely.51 The Court held that to 
withstand a motion to dismiss the underlying pleading must contain 
enough facts to suggest that a conspiracy to restrict trade existed.52 
The Court averred that this holding did not impose a heightened 
 
 47. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 544 (2007). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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pleading standard counter to precedent, but instead fulfilled the 
intentions of the Federal Rules by only allowing claims with “enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”53 
Despite the Court’s assurance that it did not make a substantive 
change to the pleading standard and its suggestion that Bell Atlantic 
may be inapplicable to cases outside of antitrust, the use of a new 
“plausibility” standard, rather than the more objective “short, plain 
statement,” involved an interpretation of the Federal Rules in 
general.54 
Unfortunately, the Court has not fully defined what facts make a 
claim “plausible” except by stating that it is not the heightened 
standard specifically rejected in Swierkiwicz.55 Because the Court 
chose to define the “plausibility” in general and negative terms, the 
scope of Swierkiwicz’s application to non-antitrust pleadings, 
including how the courts should use the “plausibility” standard during 
the preliminary proceedings of Bivens claims, remains undefined. 
Certainly, questions remain as to how the Court may apply 
“plausibility” without judicial rulemaking. 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Iqbal v. Hasty,56 the Second Circuit held that Iqbal’s complaint 
stated a substantive due process claim against the federal officials 
involved, including Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director 
Mueller, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.57 The defendant 
government officers argued that Iqbal’s allegations did not allege they 
acted with sufficient “personal involvement” and that the allegations 
were too conclusory to overcome the qualified immunity defense.58 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. The district court dismissed the claims against Hasty and the other BOP defendants. 
Therefore, Hasty and the others were not parties to the Supreme Court appeal. 
 57. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit also made several 
other holdings that were not considered by the Supreme Court: (1) 9/11 and the emergency 
circumstances surrounding Iqbal’s detainment did not lessen his established constitutional 
rights; (2) Iqbal’s procedural due process rights were not clearly established; and (3) the prison 
warden was not entitled to qualified immunity defense for certain aspects of the complaint. Id. 
 58. Id. at 151. Again, the appeal also dealt with the qualified immunity defense on the basis 
that the allegations “do not allege the violation of a clearly established right,” and “the 
defendants actions were objectively reasonable.” Id. While a finding of either of these bases 
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The argument, however, was unsuccessful due to the court’s 
interpretation of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly’s “plausibility standard.” 
The Second Circuit found Bell Atlantic provided an insufficient basis 
for the defendants’ argument that a heightened pleading standard is 
required when the qualified immunity defense has been invoked.59 
First, the court explicitly denied that the Bell Atlantic 
“plausibility” requirement creates a universal standard of heightened 
pleading. Instead, the standard allows a court, on a case-by-case basis, 
to request a pleader to add facts to the claim if the court finds such 
amplification needed to render the claim plausible.60 Even though the 
court held that Bell Atlantic, in “its full force, is limited to the antitrust 
context,”61 it found that the language of the opinion, when taken as a 
whole, suggested a desire by the Supreme Court to alter pleading 
standards, although in a limited fashion.62 Therefore, the Second 
Circuit chose to adopt Bell Atlantic as applicable to Iqbal.63 
The court went on to hold that the allegations against the 
government officers were sufficient to establish their personal 
involvement in the alleged discriminatory conduct because the 
officers “condoned the [challenged] policy.”64 Essentially, the court 
again attempted to apply Bell Atlantic by stating “it is plausible to 
believe that senior officials of the Department of Justice would be 
aware of policies concerning the detention of those arrested by 
federal officers.”65 The court held that it was also plausible that the 
senior officials “would know about, condone, or otherwise have 
personal involvement” in the manner in which these detention 
policies were actually enforced.66 
Although the court applied Bell Atlantic in its attempt to find 
“plausibility,” its use of the phrase “personal involvement” invokes 
the Second Circuit’s earlier holding in Colon v. Coughlin, which 
defined the rules for establishing personal involvement—i.e., creating 
 
would be dispositive, neither is being considered on certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (Feb. 6, 2008) (No. 07-1015), cert granted. 
 59. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158. 
 60. Id. at 157–58 (emphasis in original). 
 61. Id. at 157. 
 62. Id. at 155–56. 
 63. Id. at 157–58. 
 64. Id. at 165. 
 65. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 166. 
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a policy under which unconstitutional practices occurred or exhibiting 
deliberate indifference to the inmates’ rights).67 These precedents are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the attempt in one sentence to 
combine the Bell Atlantic and Colon lines of cases only emphasizes 
the gap between them.68 
Despite acknowledging that neither Ashcroft nor Mueller were 
personally involved in the decision to classify Iqbal as a “high 
interest” detainee, the court determined that their lack of actual 
decision-making did not insulate the two supervisory officials from 
liability.69 As a result, Iqbal could sue Ashcroft and Mueller, despite 
their qualified immunity defenses, without even implying that either 
official was actually involved in the decisions that violated his 
constitutional rights.70 This determination was made despite Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald’s requirement that “‘bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to 
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.’”71 Rather than relying on 
the language of Harlow, the court emphasized the language of 
Crawford-El v. Britton, distinguishing Harlow on the basis that there 
is no malice alleged in or required by Iqbal’s claim and observing that 
other mechanisms exist to protect higher officials.72 As a result, the 
court held that Harlow did not impose a heightened pleading 
standard for persons making Bivens claims.73 
The Second Circuit recognized the general need for the qualified 
immunity defense and the potential threat to that defense posed by 
adhering to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than using a 
heightened pleading standard.74 The court emphasized that, upon 
remand, the district court “‘must exercise its discretion in a way that 
protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense . . . so that 
officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery 
or trial proceedings.’”75 Essentially, the Second Circuit sought to make 
 
 67. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing a private cause of action 
against high-ranking government officials based on a constructive notice theory). 
 68. See supra Part III.A (describing the uncertainty surrounding the application of 
qualified immunity in Bivens suits). 
 69. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 166. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 154 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)). 
 72. Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1998)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 159. 
 75. Id. (quoting Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597–98) (emphasis in original)). 
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summary judgment readily available to high-level officials, but not at 
the pleading stage.76 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Iqbal v. Hasty decision poses several theoretical and practical 
problems. First, the Second Circuit’s decision to expand Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly beyond its literal antitrust scope to create a general 
pleading rule contradicts the policy represented by the less explicit 
and less burdensome pleading requirements permitted to establish 
supervisors’ personal liability in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Without delving into the details of 
Bivens and its progeny, the court’s decision evinces the legal 
complications that the panel faced in applying the holding in Bell 
Atlantic to Iqbal. Rather than applying Harlow v. Fitzgerald and 
limiting Crawford-El v. Britton to its facts, the court invoked the 
Supreme Court’s language used to distinguish Harlow from 
Crawford-El to hold both that other mechanisms exist to protect 
high-ranking officials from unmeritorious action besides early 
dismissal and that Harlow sought only to protect against “broad-
reaching” discovery.77 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court provided no 
guidance to help determine the difference between the “broad-
reaching” discovery against which courts are supposed to protect 
government officials and “broad discretion” in the discovery process 
that is supposedly a more equitable method by which to balance 
competing interests.78 
The application of Crawford-El to the facts of Iqbal results in two 
problematic outcomes. First, by imposing an ambiguous plausibility 
standard and by putting greater weight on the need for discovery than 
on the potential damage to the ability of higher officials to perform 
their national security duties, the Second Circuit risks stripping the 
implied immunity defense of much of its protective powers. Second, 
by ordering the district court to limit discovery on remand, the 
Second Circuit lengthens the discovery process, thereby increasing the 
cost to the parties. Considering the difficulty of establishing a case 
against supervisory parties, there seems to be no need to increase 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 154. 
 78. Id. at 154–55. 
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costs. Because of the limitations on discovery against high-ranking 
official, the process is not likely to lead to any facts clearly 
establishing personal involvement without risking substantial 
interference with Ashcroft’s or Mueller’s ability to perform their 
duties. There is also the risk that highly sensitive information may be 
leaked as a result of the discovery process. 
This decision could have the practical consequence of permitting 
unsubstantiated allegations of constructive knowledge to defeat the 
qualified immunity defense and, even more worrisome to the nation’s 
national security, could lead to inquiry into the subjective motives of 
high-officials in privileged positions. Not only is national security a 
major concern, but the high-ranking officials entrusted with 
maintaining this security are particularly susceptible targets for 
litigation. Therefore, the Second Circuit’s holding, once applied, would 
be difficult to limit to this case’s facts, leading to a significant increase 
in litigation involving high-profile government officials. These 
problems could be contained somewhat if Iqbal stands for the 
proposition that trial courts must limit discovery in these cases, but 
this seems to be a poor solution when one considers the potential 
risks should any privileged information guarded by the offices of the 
Attorney General or Director of the FBI leak to the general public. 
Second, the Circuit Court’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic creates 
more confusion than it remedies. Rather than taking the Supreme 
Court at its word and dismissing cases when the complaint contained 
no more than bare allegations and legal conclusions, the Second 
Circuit lifted various quotations from Bell Atlantic, took them out of 
context, and split them into two categories: one pointing toward a 
heightened pleading standard and the other limiting Bell Atlantic to 
establishing a plausibility standard.79 Although it used these 
categories, the Second Circuit decided to follow Bell Atlantic but not 
technically classify it as a heightened pleading standard;80 therefore it 
did not entirely accept either of the two categories it delineated. 
The most troubling question is whether the Bell Atlantic 
“plausibility” standard actually requires more specific pleadings than 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require. Though Iqbal 
emphasized that Bell Atlantic does not impose a more demanding 
 
 79. Id. at 155–57. 
 80. Id. at 158. 
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pleading standing,81 the Second Circuit seemed to acknowledge that, 
in some circumstances, the plausibility standard requires plaintiffs to 
“supplement” normal notice pleading under the Federal Rules and 
Conley v. Gibson.82 If a “supplement” to the default standard does not 
heighten the standard, what does? 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Strengths & Weaknesses of Defendants’ Case 
The strengths of the defendants’ case are largely outlined above. 
Essentially, their arguments emphasized increasing efficiency, creating 
unity across the circuits, and maintaining the strength of the qualified 
immunity defense for national security reasons, particularly in light of 
the War on Terrorism and the weaknesses in national security shown 
by the 9/11 attacks. 
The defendants focused on the merits of a heightened pleading 
standard emphasized by the Second Circuit’s decision: first, that the 
heightened standard is essential to allow officials to carry out their 
roles without fear of constant litigation, particularly in fact patterns 
such as in Iqbal v. Hasty where the only connection petitioners have 
to the alleged action is constructive notice; and second, that allowing 
these cases to go forward facilitates the broad-ranging discovery that 
the qualified immunity defense is meant to prevent.83 
Despite the strong set of interests presented by Ashcroft and 
Mueller, the Court must consider the competing interests that 
supports denying a heightened pleading standard in qualified 
immunity situations. Unlimited immunity would free government 
officials to indirectly order subordinates to commit constitutional 
violations and would support less oversight by these officials when 
supervising their various branches. 
B. Strengths & Weaknesses of Iqbal’s Case 
The strength of Iqbal’s case stems primarily from the 
constitutional claims at issue. Iqbal’s complaint alleges violations of 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 177. 
 83. Id. at 158. 
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his freedom to practice his religion, his right to an attorney, and 
various other types of discrimination that violate rights considered 
fundamental to the American ideal.84 Complainants like Iqbal, who 
are kept in solitary confinement and have very little access to 
information, would find it incredibly difficult to reach discovery if 
they had to allege information directly implicating officials like 
Ashcroft and Mueller whose personal involvement can only be 
established through the creation or condoning of a general policy. 
Iqbal can argue that by refusing to allow these types of cases to 
progress to discovery, the Court would have to find that higher 
officials are granted carte blanche discretion when creating 
unconstitutional policies as long as their subordinates actually 
institute the offending policies. Iqbal’s argument would, however, face 
the difficulty that the Second Circuit did not rely heavily on Colon v. 
Caughlin—allowing a private suit of action against high-ranking 
government officials based on a constructive notice theory—in 
making its holding in Iqbal, so it is less likely that the Supreme Court 
will rely on Colon to resolve Iqbal’s case. Generally, the weaknesses 
of the plaintiff’s case mirror the strengths of the defendants’ case. 
C. Likely Disposition 
As of April 12, 2009, the Supreme Court had still not reached a 
decision on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, although oral argument was heard on 
December 10, 2008.85 It is likely the Supreme Court will hold that the 
complaint was not sufficient to defeat the defense of qualified 
immunity held by high-level government officials acting in their 
official capacities. Because of the very high rank of the officers in 
question and the sensitive nature of their duties, the Court probably 
will find that allowing this case to advance to further discovery would 
more likely expose confidential information to the public than reveal 
Ashcroft’s or Mueller’s actual knowledge of the unconstitutional 
behavior of their subordinates. This balance of interests comprises the 
very reason for maintaining a qualified immunity defense. 
Although the Supreme Court limited the application of Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald in Crawford-El v. Britton, the broad concept of supervisory 
 
 84. Id. at 149–50, n.3. 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 U.S. 2931 (Dec. 10, 2008) (No. 07-
1015). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/15/2009 11:54:50 AM 
390 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:375 
 
liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics coupled with the lenient pleading standard 
suggested by the Second Circuit would undermine the qualified 
immunity defense to a degree that would be counter to previous 
decisions by the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit succeeded in 
creating a confusing pleading standard that is not universally 
“heightened” beyond the Federal Rules’s standard, but one that can 
be essentially heightened at the judge’s discretion. That the Second 
Circuit did not decide that a heightened pleading standard should be 
imposed on claims facing a qualified immunity defense will likely 
allow the Court to maintain the boundaries of qualified immunity 
defense, at least in this limited context. 
 
